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This article examines the image of Empire developed in public discourse in Italy during
the late Liberal period and Fascism by placing it in the context of representations of the
British Empire, with which Italian imperial ambitions were compared. There is a
continuity in seeing the British Empire as the expression of industrial and commercial
modernity and its resultant strength, but what in the Liberal period was seen as an
unparalleled superiority became under Fascism a supremacy acquired in a particular
period but now exhibiting signs of decline, which Fascism should contest and surpass.
Admiration of the British was mixed with disparagement: key ﬁgures expressed a
competitive resentment towards Britain and its dominant international position, seeing
it as the epitome of ‘modern’ imperial power against which Fascism was destined to be
measured. In the 1930s signs of the British Empire’s decline were sought, developing
the idea in Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire that British domination
would also rise and fall, and announcing the replacement of the ‘British order’, founded
on commercial modernity and the strength of money and capital, by Fascism’s new
civilisation, with its authentic heritage of imperial romanita`. This competitiveness
towards Britain, which historiography has principally seen as a component of foreign
policy (as was clear over Ethiopia), has additional signiﬁcance when seen as an element
of political culture that relates to the concept of the State. The autonomy and strength of
the State were an important feature of Fascism’s self-representation and of its legal
culture, and in this light the possession of an empire came to be seen as an essential
aspect of statehood and power.
Keywords: Fascism; Liberal Italy; modernity; Empire; State; journalism; strength;
power
To Dino Grandi, as he took on the role of Italian ambassador in London in 1929, the then
Secretary General of the League of Nations and future ambassador in Rome, Eric Drummond,
seemed ‘[t]all, thin and utterly British. He doesn’t appreciate beautiful things. He stayed in
Madrid for a fortnight without going to the Prado, but let no day pass without having his round of
golf.’ Drummond was a product of the legendary educational model reserved for the upper
classes, described in Grandi’s private diary:
Eton. The school desks are made of wood from the timbers of Spanish ships taken in the battle where
Queen Elizabeth defeated and destroyed Philip II’s great Spanish Armada. When these sons of lords,
viscounts and dukes do something ‘unfair’ their shirts are removed and they are soundly thrashed by
their teacher with a cane, surrounded by their fellow pupils who watch keenly for any tears. These
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British do not teachmuch Latin,Mathematics orGreek, it is true; but they teach how to bemen, to have
character, and to achieve that arrogance, which is the secret of their greatness. (Nello 2003, 141)
It is revealing that after Mussolini’s former Minister for Foreign Affairs had restated the
stereotypes then current in Europe and Italy regarding the British national character, he reﬂected
thoughtfully on the shortcomings of his own compatriots’ behaviour:
[w]e Italians are not arrogant enough. It is one thing to be noisy and boastful, and another to be
quietly arrogant. If we could learn some of the virtues of these Romans of Britain, we would be the
world’s leading people. (Nello 2003)
Grandi’s identiﬁcation of the contemporary British with the ancient Romans, made within
the conﬁnes of his diary and never expressed in any writing for public circulation, was at the root
of a problematic admiration that even one of the ﬁrst Fascists like Grandi could not hide, at least
from himself. This intensiﬁed the antagonism between the Mediterranean aspirations of the
Fascist regime, which projected the myth of romanita` onto itself with increasing readiness and
conviction, and the people that by their deeds, and with their dominating qualities, had for almost
two centuries been the embodiment of the idea of empire. Admiration and detraction were thus
inextricably mixed together. As Grandi observed in his diary in January 1929, the British as a
whole were ‘cold, uncultured and very great, like the Romans’ (Nello 2003, 141). Giuseppe
Bottai, in his diary for January 1943, wrote that the extraordinary resilience of the British
population under German bombardment should be ascribed to their ‘stupidity’:
[w]e can see that the British people are tough and resolute; they have coped well with the German
bombing, in which they have lost one and a half million houses. The British rely on one strength,
their stupidity. This is not just a ﬁgure of speech but the actual nature of the British intellect, which is
slower and duller. (Bottai 1989, 350)
In this article I will be highlighting how interwoven admiration and criticism for the British
people, many indications of which can be seen in statements by proponents of the Fascist regime,
were not just the expression of a complex but well-known competitive approach to Great Britain
and its position of supremacy in international relationships (Bosworth 1998, 2005, 367–395).
They also reﬂected the belief that having an imperial dimension was an essential attribute of
power with a ‘modern’ basis, as the British Empire had been demonstrating for at least two
centuries (Edwards 1999; Bell 2007). As a result, as we will see presently, in a transposition of
the perspective of Edward Gibbon, the horizon was anxiously scanned for any signs of the
decline that would necessarily follow the high point of the greatness Britain had already
achieved. At the turn of the eighteenth century Gibbon, in his History of the Decline and Fall of
the Roman Empire, had seen the arc travelled by the Empire of the Caesars as a metaphor for
future British rule, then in the ascendant;1 while in the Edwardian period references to the
models of the classical age as antecedents of the British Empire were widespread,2 in Italy in the
1930s and early 1940s Fascist leaﬂets and studies announced the ‘nemesis of history’, which was
to send British domination ‘to the archaeological museum of dead civilisations’ (‘La crisi
dell’Impero Britannico’ 1941, 46).3
The inevitable conflict
The extent to which the very existence of the British Empire depended on British ideology,
culture, politics, education and society as a whole, across the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
is still the subject of debate between historians. It lies within the context of an increased interest
in imperial and global history that continues to generate wider and comparative studies;4 this has
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also had its reverberations within Italian historiography (see Romanelli 2010; Abbattista 2010).
Consideration of the issue of the impact of the Empire on British society, notwithstanding some
continued discussion, has by and large moved on from a phase of highlighting the pervasiveness
of imperial ideology in culture, politics and education, just as the ‘orientalist’ approach, which
showed the function served in British culture by seeing colonial subjects as ‘other’, has lost its
intensity.5 The focus is now on a more developed analysis of the range of attitudes the population
had towards the Empire, and of the variety of experiences that resulted from it. From the image
of the Empire as mirroring the differences and internal structure of British society (Cannadine
2001), to the careful assessment of the real degree of impact that imperial factors had within
British society, and how much these interacted with other factors (Porter 2004), the best studies
show how the existence of the Empire loosened and complicated the boundaries of a hierarchical
society. This responded to the stimulus of imperialism in ways that were often controversial and
subject to debate, rather than in a monolithic manner.6
For Italian Fascists, however, whether sympathetic or not, the identiﬁcation between
Britishness and the British Empire was common currency. As Bernard Porter says of foreign
observers in general, ‘[f]or them, Britain was deﬁned by her empire, and by the power,
arrogance, and sometimes atrocious behaviour they associated with it. This was because the face
Britain usually presented to them, as foreigners, was the imperial one’ (2004, 304). It was not
necessary to be friendly with Great Britain and its empire to be attracted to it, as is seen in
Buruma’s amusing portrayal of Kaiser Wilhelm II, ‘[t]he Anglomane who hated England’ (1998,
199–222), who proudly wore the uniform of a British navy admiral, read Kipling and P.G.
Wodehouse, and unconditionally admired his grandmother, Queen Victoria. Convinced,
however, by Houston S. Chamberlain’s view of the state of advanced Judaisation and
cosmopolitan degeneration of the British Isles, he proposed to save Great Britain from itself,
charging Admiral von Tirpitz, a ‘peculiarly resentful Anglophile’ (Buruma 1998, 213), with
construction of a powerful ﬂeet, modelled on the Royal Navy, that would compete with the
British Empire and take its place.
Competitive resentment also enlivened many of Fascism’s leaders and publicists. It is not
surprising that Roberto Forges Davanzati, during the months of preparation for the assault on
Ethiopia, emphasised the imperial interests which determined British hostility towards
Fascism’s African plans, a hostility heightened by the action of the League of Nations. As he
never tired of explaining in Cronache del regime, his daily evening radio programme broadcast
by EIAR, the Italy–Abyssinia dispute was simply a colonial clash between the great nation of
Italy, now back in the European forefront thanks to Fascism, and a feudal slave-driving
kingdom, Ethiopia, which should not be allowed the status of ‘nation’. It was a conﬂict that
ought to be resolved on African soil and contained there, without repercussions in the European
context:
The dangers of this clash for Europe and the world lie exclusively in the attempted presentation of it
in spurious League of Nations terms. This has been the particular and very unfortunate political
endeavour of the British Conservative government, which has shown itself to be clearly only acting
in its own authentically imperialist interests, but thought it could conceal these behind a mask of
League disinterestedness and zeal. There are two reasons for this: to present itself in Europe and the
world as an advocate for universal peace; and to give itself an advantage, on the eve of elections, in
relation to the Labour opposition which exploits the myth of the League of Nations, especially now
that Bolshevik Russia has arrived in Geneva. (Forges Davanzati 1937, 113)
It is even less surprising that this anti-British approach was revived during the Second World
War: from ‘God curse the English’, the graphic daily refrain of Mario Appelius, another radio
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journalist,7 to the more subtle observations of Virginio Gayda, one of the publicists closest to the
Fascist government, and accredited as the ofﬁcial spokesperson for the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs. In 1941 Gayda, at the end of a lengthy treatise summarising British–Italian relations
from the Risorgimento to the present, attempted to present the Italy–Germany Axis as architect
of the ‘construction of a new order in Europe with separate but co-ordinated tasks, in united
communities, for the great ruling nations’:
The new European order is the direct antithesis of the old order conceived and pursued by Britain
during the centuries of its domination. British policy, up to the war against Germany and Italy, aimed
at the destruction, not construction, of European unity. It only kept its eye on the continent and
European waters in order to look out for anything that would serve its immediate political supremacy
and its military power. Its only concerns were to separate the European peoples, meddle with and
oppose their interests, subjugate the weaker countries, and damage, as much as possible, the stronger
and more independent ones, those most capable of attracting and organising the other nations.
(Gayda 1941, 549)
On this basis, Gayda set out to justify the inevitability of Anglo-Italian hostility. There was
the theme of Anglo-Judaism as the reason for corruption of Anglo-Saxon plutocratic modernity,
for which Gayda, like Interlandi as we will see below, was one of the earliest and most ardent
exponents: ‘[r]acial politics arrived late in Italy. In Britain and the United States, however,
Judaism made very early moves against Fascist Italy, whose economic and social system did not
appear advantageous to the interests of its internationalist banking’ (Gayda 1941, 297).8 Apart
from this, the British were above all criticised for having an empire and for wanting to preserve
and enlarge this, opportunistically balancing international alliances and enmities to this end.
For the diplomatic commentator of the Giornale d’Italia, the calculating nature of British
friendship for Italy during the Risorgimento and immediately after uniﬁcation was especially
reprehensible. In his expansive account Gayda insistently restated the anti-French motivation of
British support for the nationalist case in pre-uniﬁcation Italy, and lamented this:
Britain wanted to prevent France spreading its inﬂuence and domination over Italy. It even wanted
Italy, on its own or in alliance with other countries, to be a permanent force of opposition towards
France. Given these twin aims, both negative and positive, all the varying British positions in regard
to Italian problems and movements derived from an assessment of their potential usefulness against
the French. The Italian cause was almost never considered in London on its own merits, for its
vibrant humanity, or for its other historical values and ideals. (1941, 66)
This complaint was emphasised further:
Britain has thus had no genuine friendship for Italy and its cause. [ . . . ] [I]n English policy genuine
friendships never exist. There are subordinated client networks or mutual interests of varying
duration. In Britain, the nation proclaimed to be a friend is one that more or less willingly, rightly or
wrongly, serves British interests by denying its own independent interests. (70)
The apparent naivety of this accusation might seem odd coming from a writer like Gayda, an
adviser to Galeazzo Ciano and an experienced observer of international politics who had
witnessed the Great War and the post-war crisis in person.9 An explanation emerges with the
main subject addressed soon after: the inevitability of competition in the Mediterranean, where
the new Italy was ‘imprisoned’ by the British navy. The justiﬁcation for Italy’s African
aspirations was made with reference to the old concept of the Mediterranean as an ‘inner sea’,
safe passage across which was essential for it to have freedom of action:
Italy seeks freedom and control in the Mediterranean above all to ensure the defence of its territory,
the independence of its national and economic life, and connectedness for its various populations,
which are distributed across the peninsula, the islands and the more distant lands of Africa. Italy
CMIT 968116—1/10/2014—RAJESHKUMAR.R—496306———Style 2
L. Cerasi4
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
seeks freedom on the inner sea in order to achieve [ . . . ] unfettered contact with the civilised peoples
of the world, and with the earth’s primary resources that are needed for the work of its great
productive culture. [ . . . ] Because of this, the war against Britain is one of the most serious and
deﬁning moments in Italy’s entire national history after the end of the Roman Empire. [ . . . ] It is the
natural continuation and essential epilogue to the wars of the Risorgimento. [ . . . ] The Italian nation
cannot live freely on its territory if it is not free to move and provide for itself on the sea that
surrounds it, if it cannot freely leave this closed sea, whose gates are controlled by Britain, and if it
does not make the independence of both its foreign policy and its economy secure from competing
international causes, and from contingent or permanent foreign controls. (Gayda 1941, 545–546)
The idea of the ‘spiritual’ nature of a continuing Risorgimento also faithfully reiterated the post-
Mazzinian stylistic feature of the universalist ambitions of Italian nationalism, which as Emilio
Gentile shows ‘had ambitions to take its place on a level of epoch-making superiority compared
to other kinds of European nationalism, presenting itself both as a national and universal
revolution’ (2009, 173). Fascist Italy, as the Fascist scholar Carlo Curcio declared, transcended
the self-interest of individual nations to establish itself as a superior entity, ‘as the central part of
a system, as an element of an organization that is above all spiritual and therefore civilized’
(Gentile 2009, 174).
In Gayda’s argument, however, the insistent criticism of British ruthlessness, repeated often,
cut across his promotion of the model of spiritual and universalist imperialism. He recalled that it
had been Britain, in competition with France for control of Egypt after the opening of the Suez
Canal, which ‘invited’ Italy into the Horn of Africa, while at the same time letting France occupy
Tunisia in 1881, to keep it away from the Red Sea. It did this without ever committing itself to
bilateral agreements:
Italy has always been the poor relation, called on if needed but forgotten if nothing can be asked of
her. (Gayda 1941, 96)
Italy asked for stronger guarantees and more detailed commitments to its defence and the resolution
of its interests. Britain refused; it wished to remain the arbiter of problems and events, and free to
make its own decisions. (101)
Italy, however, continued to trust in British policy with a faithfulness that on more than one occasion
appeared almost servile. (108)
When in 1884 the British Foreign Ofﬁce encouraged Italy to occupy Massawa, it was not:
the understanding of real needs and the recognition of Italian rights, in the competition for colonies
between the great powers, which motivated it, but simply the quest for an ally who might share the
burden and risks of the struggle against French expansion. (115)
Where British policy is concerned, Italy ought not to be an independent protagonist in colonial
history, but just a second-rank partner in British plans. (117)
As a junior partner, Italy might ﬁnd itself redundant as alliances changed: ‘The limited and
episodic British defence of Italian interests has only ever served its struggle with France’ (121).
After the Fashoda Incident, the rapprochement between Britain and France ‘betrayed’ earlier
commitments to Italy: ‘Now that its relationship with France had been determined by the
agreement of 1899, Britain no longer had any immediate interest in friendship with Italy in the
colonial struggle’ (106). This was not to mention the purposes served by inviting Italy to join the
Entente, the broken promises of the London Pact, the dispersal of the colonies of Wilhelm II’s
defeated empire without considering Italy, and so on. In the insistent repetition of resentment
towards British ‘coldness’, ‘impassiveness’ and ‘indifference’ when faced with Italy’s essential
needs, in addition to the obvious symptoms of feelings of inferiority, another motive should be
understood. We are aided here by a speciﬁc historical comparison, made at the end of the
treatise:
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The war between Rome and Carthage seems to anticipate, far back in history, the war between Italy
and Great Britain. [ . . . ] Carthage weighed down on Rome with its great ﬂeet, threatening the
Mediterranean and the Italian peninsula, its constructive politics, its trading, and its need for
expansion. (446–447)10
Gayda was writing in 1941. With the role of the Carthaginians given to the British, and
Rome’s legacy to Fascism, he stressed the contrast between the imperial aspirations of the Latin
city and those of the Phoenician colony. The difference lay in the diverse nature of their push for
expansion, one being the expression of ‘a peasant and warrior people, anxious for order and
work’, while the other reﬂected ‘a trading, speculating, commercial and aggressive people’.
Above all, they were differentiated by contrasting ideas about supremacy, which for Gayda also
had to have an overall strategic purpose. There was an obvious allusion to the Mediterranean
objectives of Mussolini’s ‘parallel war’ alongside Italy’s German ally: ‘Rome, ﬁghting
Carthage, was not only thinking about its defence and its power. The aim was in fact to create
unity and harmony among the Mediterranean peoples’ (446).
Antagonism towards the British, whose empire had for decades embodied the historical
legacy of Roman dominating strength, has much clearer signiﬁcance when seen from this neo-
Gibbonian perspective. Among the reasons for the anti-British polemic was the reclamation of
the legacy of ‘that Rome where Christ is a Roman’, in Dante’s well-known verse, which had seen
the birth of ‘the powerful entity of the Christian church, which also inherited in part the concept
of imperial power and one day had to subject sovereigns and peoples to its moral authority’ (Pais
1929/30, 30).
Empire, strength and modernity
Competitive ill-feeling towards the British Empire, expressed in the reversal of Gibbon’s
metaphor outlined by Gayda, held within it a reference to what was, despite everything, the
epitome of modern imperial power, by which Fascism had to measure itself. Although according
to the Fascist perspective it was now in evident decline, the incarnation of imperial power in
modern times had been the British Empire, and with this there had to be a reckoning. Moreover,
the comparison of the British with the Carthaginians indicated the negative meaning ascribed to
the ‘modernity’ of the British Empire: this was a commercial modernity, expressing the strength
of money and capital, and in decline, as it was the antithesis of the new civilisation represented
by Fascism, which was rooted in the myth of ‘romanita`’.
Before Fascism, this very same commercial, capitalist and industrial modernity had been a
matter of great fascination for observers of the British Empire at its peak, due to its
representation of the ‘natural’ expression of economic strength. This had marked a signiﬁcant
shift in perspective from the essentially liberal political importance that it was given by
nineteenth-century anglophiles (Cerasi 2002; Biagini 2004).
Perhaps it is not surprising that in the Liberal period its most enthusiastic admirers included
Giuseppe Bevione, a nationalist, expansionist and imperialist who became well known over his
impassioned support for the Libyan war (Bevione 1912). The year before the Italo–Turkish
conﬂict, as London correspondent for La Stampa, he published in book form his observations on
‘the people who could produce the Bible and who had to conquer the world’ (Bevione 1910, 9),
starting with an ecstatic reﬂection on the metropolitan vastness of London, ‘the city of the world
that elicits the most compelling admiration, giving the visitor an unforgettable memory’ (5):
Why? What creates the extraordinarily powerful fascination of London, the indescribable emanation
of sublimeness that seizes you the moment you tumble out of Charing Cross station into the oceanic
[AQ7]
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maelstrom of the Strand, staying with you forever, even when the rivers of time and distance have
carried you far away from the metropolis? (5)
Leaving aside futuristic explanations – ‘London is a city of energy, this is the answer’ (5) – the
root cause for the dazzling modernity of the British capital, an expression of the consequences of
its imperial primacy, was seen to lie in the nation’s native individualism:
Britain is strong, because it believes in and counts on individual energies alone. [ . . . ] With these
ideas spread right across the island, a society of ‘the right men in the right places’ took shape: that is
to say, a nation of strong individuals which also demands respect when they express themselves in
collective endeavour. (392–393)
In fact: ‘It is into Britain’s moral rather than geological substratum, and into its soul rather than
its coal, that the roots of its imperial greatness were driven by destiny’ (9). In linking together
imperialism, individualism and modernity, Bevione was drawing on an established model. This
had been introduced by the success of Guglielmo Ferrero’s Europa giovane (1897) and located
Anglo-Saxon societies at the forefront of the development of civilization, due to the non-
community nature of their main social ties. Olindo Malagodi’s contribution was to highlight
imperialism’s interdependence with deployment of the power of industrialism, in another book
compiled in London, while he was correspondent for the Giolittian La Tribuna. The ‘culture of
work’ was the foundation of contemporary life:
Production is the most important organ of society, being the heart that pumps the life-giving surge of
blood right through the organism: every change in this necessarily has repercussions for all its parts.
The technical revolution has thus been at the root of a great social and moral revolution. (Malagodi
1901, 11)
Its most spectacular manifestation had been imperial expansion, an inevitable product of its
historical development:
Imperialism is not justiﬁed except when and where the conditions exist that give it a purpose; when it
creates, rather than just destroying; when it contributes something, rather than just taking away from
the peoples where it is imposed; when it sows the seeds of a higher existence among the inevitable
ruins left in its wake. The only genuine and necessary imperialism of our times is therefore that
which comes from industrial civilization. (Malagodi 1901, 295)
Malagodi had been present at the culmination of this, the majestic Victorian Jubilee of 1897.
As the ﬁrst decade of the twentieth century ended, however, it no longer seemed possible to
consider the British Empire’s gains without also noting various indications of a weakening in its
previously unquestioned primacy. Bevione was regretfully nostalgic: ‘[t]his Britain has been
great, and should never die; because it has given the world so many precious gifts, even a
momentary consideration of its twilight makes one shudder’ (1910, 462). However, he listed the
most obvious signs: German and American competition threatened the proﬁts of British trade
and industry; Fabian and trade union socialism had made great strides; protectionism seemed
inevitable:
The factors that have paved the way for the arrival of socialism in Britain are the same ones that, on
other fronts, will bring to this foggy island from the continent the taxation regime that was Joe
Chamberlain’s ﬁnal advice to his country; they are the same factors that have started to break away
the jewels in the heavy crown of British industrial and commercial hegemony. (Bevione 1910, 362)
The reasons lay in the waning of the individualism that had sustained the strong development of
the Victorian age: ‘[T]he beginning of decline coincides with a weakening of individualist
instincts, and with a diversion of national thinking away from the individualist current of
previous generations’ (393). This exposed the British Empire to the growing German threat,
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which was now not only commercial but also military: ‘Why does it not swoop down on
Germany on the high seas, destroy its future army while this is still in embryo, capture its
merchant navy, and damage beyond repair its claims to domination?’ (407).11
Malagodi, by contrast, had seen in the emergence of militarism ‘a serious symptom of the
degeneration of modern imperialism’:
What are the relationships between that progressive and peace-loving civilization that we believed
and hoped should conquer the world, just with the strength of its organic superiority, and these new
imperialist ambitions and recent episodes of militarism that appear to contradict that hope and trust?
(1901, 5)
Militarism and industrialism, he believed, were two antithetical terms, and British imperialism,
generated by its industrial leadership, was at risk of mutating should it give in to the call for
armed force:
The old peace-loving Britain, as I have observed, built its empire without seeking to do so and almost
without realising, driven by its own organic energy; but this creative energy has in fact for several
years been weakened, or has come up against the new energy of other peoples. (29)
These included:
those small new peoples who show that they have great qualities, like the Boers, who have done such
magniﬁcent work as agricultural pioneers on the vast high plains of southern Africa, in that difﬁcult
and cursed terrain where all previous attempts at colonisation, by nations who have boasted of being
in the forefront regarding power and wealth, have failed. (401)12
It was the Second Boer War, then under way, that was the indicator of this mutation:
The war in the Transvaal has shown Britain undergoing a profound transformation. This conﬂict has
gone against all those high ideals of international justice that Britain had advocated since the start of
the century, and that had made it so popular among other nations; it has gone against many of those
new formulas for imperial expansion that it had discovered and been the ﬁrst to apply, and to which
British imperialism owed its good fortune among the pitiful failures of its rivals; but worse still, it has
revealed an extraordinary metamorphosis of the country’s spirit. [ . . . ] In this visage can be seen the
strain and violent tension of a proud will, together with the bitter unease of a secret sense of
weakness. (27, 29)
The exercise of force, so evident in the Boer Wars, thus paradoxically heralded the beginning
of the decline of the world’s richest and most civilised nation, whose rule was no longer asserted
with ‘absent-minded’ ease, but had to be harshly imposed. In this, Malagodi echoed arguments
that were circulating widely in European political and cultural discussions of the time.13
By employing armed force rather than the supremacy of its wealth and civilisation, moreover
against the Boers, a white population of European origin, Britain was putting itself on the same
level as the other powers engaged in imperialist competition. The brutality of the military
campaign in the Transvaal appeared to reveal how British expansion was fuelled by the most
basic instinct for supremacy: ‘[i]n the Transvaal and Sudan, in India and to some extent
anywhere that there is territorial competition’, British behaviour seemed driven by ‘the thirst for
gold and conquests’ (Neal 1899). In the Nuova Antologia, not usually thought to be anti-British,
the Boers were likened to the Greeks at Thermopylae, and their challenge to the world’s greatest
colonial empire was seen as ‘heroic’ as it was motivated by issues of national independence
(Nobili Vitelleschi 1899, 351). As another correspondent observed,
when an enormously rich and arrogant nation, able to draw on vast resources, ﬁghts for reasons of
greed a relatively poor people, small in number and with no external support, victory of the former
can never be noble or worthy. (Ouida 1899, 584)
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Among the chorus of criticism for British aggression, which had few dissenting voices,14
there were also some tones of satisfaction over the ‘normalisation’ of British primacy, which
until then had been seen as beyond compare. The questioning of this was an important reason for
the continuing success of a pamphlet which had explored the causes of ‘Anglo-Saxon
superiority’, exciting great interest and quickly reaching its twenty-sixth printing, while being
translated into the main European languages (Demolins 1897).15 Edmonde Demolins, a
sociologist in the tradition of Le Play, held that the explanation for Britain’s undisputed
superiority lay not in its history and culture, as was argued by Guglielmo Ferrero (1897) at much
the same time,16 but in its educational system. Demolins’ prescription, and the reason for his
fame, was optimistic: as they were a product of education, the elements of Anglo-Saxon
‘superiority’ could be reproduced elsewhere. The gap could be closed between community-
based societies like the Latin, where the individual tended to rely on the group – the family, or
public authority – and particularist societies like the Anglo-Saxon, where the individual tended
to be self-reliant. The solution was to reproduce the educational model believed to be best for
creating ‘colonising man’: private schools, with much sport and practical activity, and an
avoidance of learning by rote. Demolins subsequently dedicated himself to putting this idea into
practice.17 His pamphlet was suffused by clear intentions to compete, and his suggestions were
received in Italy in the same vein. Many of the ills afﬂicting Italian society could be addressed by
taking inspiration from ‘education for individualism’:
The British system of education develops men, not employees; it prepares people for the struggle for
life; it keeps ‘home’ free from many low vices; it gives the individual high levels of dignity and
moral worth; and it makes the whole country impervious to socialism, by which all other peoples feel
threatened. (Garga`no 1899)
From ideas about encouraging competitive emulation, to consideration of the indications of
‘normalisation’ in relation to the Boer Wars, there was wide agreement with the observation that
closed Malagodi’s book. This foreshadowed the beginning of the end for British supremacy
across the world:
The great imperial people suddenly wakes from its humble sleep to ﬁnd itself in the enchanted palace
of its glory, wealth and power; but this awakening is fatal. Frugality is then succeeded by excess: the
triumphant people lays out for itself a colossal banquet of pleasure, pride, and vanity [ . . . ]. As we
know, however, even the longest and most splendid days of history have their sunsets; silence and
shadow, little by little, will envelop the exultant splendours of those who triumph today. (Malagodi
1901, 406)
Empire, State and power: from Adua to Addis Ababa
While there was thus continuity between the late Liberal age and Fascism in regarding the
British Empire as the latest expression of contemporary industrial and commercial modernity, it
was a continuity whose values became inverted. What in the Liberal period had represented an
unrivalled superiority – individualism, sternness of character and entrepreneurial daring, all of
which had supported the expansion of British rule across the world, and had also inspired aspects
of education policy from Italian nationalism to Fascism (Gibelli 2005) – became the mask of a
dominance acquired in a particular historical period, now showing signs of decline, which
Fascism was obliged to contest and overcome.
In my view this competitive attitude of Fascism towards Great Britain, which is evident in
the historiography as an aspect of foreign policy, especially in the 1930s (Bosworth 1996, 2005,
277–306; Mack Smith 1977; Collotti 2000), has particular signiﬁcance if it is seen as an element
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of political culture that must be located in relation to the concept of the State, within which the
dimensions of power and strength cannot be separated from the image of the Empire.
It is well known that after its re-establishment as a discipline by Orlando in the late
nineteenth century, Italian public law focused on deﬁning the attributes of statehood;18 there has
also been further exploration of the crucial role of legal culture in establishing the autonomy and
strength of the State as a distinctive element of Fascism’s self-representation (Gentile,
Lanchester, and Tarquini 2010; Battente 2005; D’Alfonso 2004; Sordi 2005). As has been
highlighted recently by detailed research on the ideological elements within the culture of the
lawyers engaged in determining colonial law in the 1930s (De Napoli 2009; De Cristofaro 2008),
possession of an empire came to be the fundamental attribute of statehood and power.
The ‘necessity’ of acquiring an imperial dimension appears clear from the conduct of the war
in Ethiopia, where an enormous logistical and military endeavour was undertaken. According to
Giorgio Rochat (2005), it was the largest colonial war ever fought: an expeditionary force of
about 500,000 soldiers (Italians and Askaris), more than 100,000 enlisted workers, 450 aircraft,
hundreds of pieces of artillery, more than 3 million tons of airlifted military equipment, against
250,000 Abyssinians who were not all properly armed. Unlike any previous colonial war, the
Ethiopian campaign called on the modern, industrial and ‘European’ mobilisation created during
the Great War, using intensive aerial bombardment, heavy artillery, armour-plated vehicles and
chemical weapons (already banned in international treaties). It was intended as a trial for the
regime, which saw a signiﬁcant number of party members go as volunteers, one expeditionary
force drawn from the Fascist militia, and the direct involvement of Mussolini in its command.
The campaign lasted seven months and was more demanding than expected; however, the
regime achieved the desired result in terms of consensus, which has been noted as reaching its
peak with the declaration of the Empire.
Why was such a disproportionate and distinctly belated effort made to acquire a colonial
territory? I am not, of course, suggesting that the reasons behind Mussolini’s African plans
remain obscure: they have been explored by excellent work on the topic (Labanca 2002, 2005;
Rochat 1971, 2005; Del Boca 1976–84, 2007). In particular, it should be remembered how
Fascist imperialism was driven forward by the internal dynamics of industrial and governmental
forces, which encouraged colonial expansionism, and the extent to which international political
considerations affected Mussolini’s plans for expansion. After 1933 both Germany and Japan
had withdrawn from the League of Nations and increased the pressure to acquire new territories,
with the invasion of Manchuria and the disregard for European borders that had been agreed at
the Treaty of Versailles. The decision to invade Ethiopia dated back to 1934: at the end of that
year the funds believed necessary were set aside, and the strategy outlined. The timescale of the
operation had been carefully calculated: Mussolini believed that as Germany was not yet ready
to ﬁght, it was unlikely that a war in Europe would break out in order to guarantee Ethiopia’s
independence, even when faced with such an open challenge to the authority of the League of
Nations, as long as the interests in the region of France and, especially, Great Britain were
preserved.
From a cultural perspective, it has been argued that part of the ideological motivation for the
Ethiopian venture should be attributed to the desire to compensate for the shortcomings of Italian
history. A particular part was played here by the memory of the defeat at Adua in 1896, which
had endured as a negative paradigm; it had in fact been the greatest and most humiliating defeat
suffered by a European country engaged in the ‘scramble for Africa’ in the ﬁnal 30 years of the
nineteenth century. Nicola Labanca has shown how the ‘march on Adua’ was due to the nature of
Crispi’s authority, which had driven this venture forward for a number of reasons: the desire to
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be part of the division of Africa, the combination of expansionism and internal authoritarianism,
the support from large industrial groups and above all the support of the monarchy and the army.
These factors came together in the ﬁgure of Crispi and in the Savoyard authoritarian tendencies,
both repressive and expansionist, that Crispi and his approach imprinted on the history of post-
uniﬁcation Italy (Labanca 1993). The ‘Adua complex’, an enduring traumatic condition not even
mitigated by the conquest of Libya after the Italo-Turkish war of 1911, was the fear of defeat in
the ﬁeld, and inﬂuenced all Italian colonial policy up to and including the way the Ethiopian
campaign was conducted. The need to ‘expunge the shame of Adua’ featured among the
arguments that the Fascist propaganda machine repeatedly presented in order to demonstrate the
need for aggression towards Ethiopia. Not surprisingly, the capture of Adua itself in October
1935, three days into the campaign, was given much attention, with the unveiling of a memorial
to the fallen of 1896 that was intended to redeem the memory of the defeat. Newspaper coverage
of the war was striking: the Corriere della Sera, the largest Italian daily, printed at least one
article on the African campaign every day, carefully screened, like all publications, by the
Ministry for Press and Propaganda run by Galeazzo Ciano.19 The rhetorical frame of reference
had been set out in the Corriere della Sera by Aldo Valori in 1931, on the 35th anniversary of the
battle. In his view its negative symbolic value should not be blamed on the army, as it had been at
the time, but on the Liberal political class alone:
Let us be honest. When we examine the complex reasons for the disaster, which can be traced back to
the whole Italian political system of the time, those few responsibilities that should be attributed to
the brigade commanders appear relatively minimal; moreover, those ofﬁcers paid for their mistaken
daring with their lives, imprisonment, and the ruin of their careers. (Valori 1931)
Now, however, with Fascism: ‘In thirty-ﬁve years, Italy has profoundly changed, not just in its
political regime, but in its control of its ambitions and passions’ (Valori 1931).
The wish to revenge previous humiliations epitomised by the ‘shame of Adua’, while it
certainly dominated Fascism’s public discourse, did not account for all the cultural and political
signiﬁcance of the Ethiopian campaign. Growing Anglophobia and the strident anti-British
campaign may provide an additional way of understanding this. It should be remembered how
post-uniﬁcation Italy had been given its cue for the pursuit of expansion in the Horn of Africa by
British benevolence and its interests.20 From the 1880s onwards London, which was involved in
containing revolts in Sudan and worried that France or Germany might exploit its weakness in
that region, had decided to encourage settlement on the edges of the Red Sea by Italy, a weak
country in its colonising infancy who would make an ideal ‘junior partner’. This continued in
subsequent decades, after Dogali and after Adua, with successive diplomatic missions to resolve
the conﬂict between the Italian government and the Ethiopian emperor, and to oversee colonial
arrangements in the Horn of Africa. Even after the assault on Ethiopia, in 1936, British policy
did not come down heavily on Mussolini’s Italy, as is well known: it soon removed the economic
sanctions, and adopted the policy of the ‘gentleman’s agreement’. The accusations of Virginio
Gayda thus went back to the injustice of British policy regarding Italian imperial rights at the
very origins of its colonial expansion, recalling how London had at various times encouraged
Italy to expand its African possessions, especially if this served to counter France, but then left it
to its own devices in cases of defeat (1941, 103, 107).21
Given this previous history, the verbal aggression of anti-British hostility, which was
unequivocal within the context of relationships in Europe and the League of Nations, then took
on greater signiﬁcance when infused by the competitive intentions which underlay Mussolini’s
actions. Orchestrations of insistent and increasing fervent Anglophobia, which became more
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intense in public debate after the Ethiopian war, expressed a clear rivalry. The modern empire, of
the traders and shopkeepers across the Channel, should return to the ancients, that fertile,
combative and frugal people which had dominated the Mediterranean two thousand years
earlier. Claudio Pavone has observed that ‘[t]he English were in fact seen as richer and more
successful competitors in imperialism. This point of view had existed for some time in Italian
nationalism; but to it the Fascists added a plebeian resentment and racist fear-cum-envy’ (2013,
99). This can be seen in the transparent references by Telesio Interlandi, the racist and anti-
Semitic editor of the Roman newspaper Il Tevere, who prior to the attack on Ethiopia published
an article with the title ‘I nostri amici inglesi’:
The British are divided into two categories, clearly identiﬁed by zoologists. The ﬁrst is represented
by that famous Briton who was astonished not to ﬁnd negroes in Calais, as he believed that the
Channel marked the end of the civilised world. The second are types like Hervey, of whom Chamfort
wrote that when he was crossing the Venetian lagoon he dipped a ﬁnger in the water, tasted it, and
announced: ‘It’s salty, so it must be ours!’ To which category does the Lord Privy Seal and secret
aspirant to the Foreign Ofﬁce, Mr Anthony Eden, belong? [ . . . ] Whatever the answer, Italians cannot
rest easy: the opinion and decisions of this likeable Lord are of great importance for them, as the
recent discussions in Geneva show. This honourable representative of humanitarian Britain sided
with civilisation and international law, and pulled off a success that the Italophobic publications of
the City will want to explain to us at their earliest opportunity. These papers, headed by the clutch
owned by Lord Beaverbrook, have decided to teach Italy a lesson, over the conﬂict with Ethiopia,
saying that the Italians suffered a setback in Africa last century, that in Tripoli in 1915 we achieved
very little, and ﬁnally that in the Great War our service record was poor. Nor will it be Mussolini who
changes the nature of this race. Italians are disturbed by these admonitions, because they recognise
that there is a vast difference between the British race and themselves, particularly as regards
civilisation. In relation to Africa, for example, Italians will never ever be capable of introducing
civilization with the methods used in the Transvaal in 1901 by the much-missed General Roberts:
methods which, as even schoolchildren know, provided for the burning of farms, destruction of crops
and herds, and sending women and children to concentration camps. These practices were not much
appreciated by world opinion, nor even by the Times of that era; but today’s Times is certainly ready
to make an honourable correction to its previous mistake. We will thus be taught by the British press
how to go to Africa, and how to earn an outstanding service record. All we need to do is to open two
or three history books to learn about the cost in cowardly and cruel acts by which the proud colonial
empire of the innocent British was built, the mountains of human skeletons on which the glory of the
British colonisers rests, and the real nature of the red stripes in the Union Jack. When we have learnt
enough, perhaps the restless Lord Privy Seal will decide that the time has come to put his own house
in order: to reconcile his appetite for ofﬁce with his weak stomach, and his puritanical fastidiousness
with his unrestrained ambition. The British newspapers, moreover, can continue to demonstrate the
extent of classic British hypocrisy: this undertaking is hopeless, but they can count on our modest
assistance. (Interlandi 1935).
The seeming irrationality of the assault on Ethiopia is still striking. Putting out a force of half
a million men, and committing most of the available military and material resources, in order to
construct a belated, unstable and ﬁnancially unproﬁtable empire,22 must have been rooted in a
conception of power and strength that was inextricably linked to the imperial image. The
historical model that had managed to incorporate modernity, strength and power within this
image was undoubtedly the British Empire. With this in mind, it should be clearer why the
acquisition of colonies under Fascism, unlike during the Liberal period (Monina 2002, 2008),
was only partially accompanied by preparatory studies on the potential proﬁtability of the
territories to be occupied, and was not determined by particular pressure from strictly ﬁnancial
interests, but was the product of a strategy of power that was eminently political (Soravia 2004).
Finally, we have seen how, especially in the 1930s when international politics and imperial
ambitions cut across each other, the rivers of rhetoric of romanita`, whose features we cannot
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consider here,23 identiﬁed the true obstacle to Fascism’s Mediterranean and African ambitions as
being Britain’s undisputed supremacy. By claiming the legacy of romanita` in the Mediterranean,
Fascism revealed its intention to compete with the British Empire; this was a kind of inversion of
Gibbon’s prophecy, which saw the future of the British colonies preﬁgured in the decline and fall
of the Roman Empire. It should also be stressed how for Fascism, in asserting the absolute – and
belated – necessity of the acquisition of an empire, this came to represent the fundamental proof
of power, and an essential aspect of the State. This was entirely consistent with the history of
uniﬁed Italy, and with the authoritarian statism of which even Fascism was a manifestation.
Translated by Stuart Oglethorpe (stuart.oglethorpe@gmail.com)
Notes
1. For an analysis of ‘Gibbonian pessimism’ and the fear of decline as a driver for the continued British
imperial expansion, see Brendon (2007). See also McKitterick and Quinault (1997).
2. See, for example, Cromer (1910); Lucas (1912); Bryce (1914). For discussion of this issue see Brendon
(2007, xvi–xx); Hyam (2010, 1–32).
3. See also Italicus (1940). But see in addition the 1932 Italian translation of the work by French writer
Andre´ Siegfried (1932), published in the series Libri scelti per servire al panorama del nostro tempo.
4. See, for example, Howe (2009); Brendon (2007); Levine (2007); Darwin (2009); Magee and
Thompson (2010); Louis (1998–99); also the work by Niall Ferguson (2003), although I will refrain
here from discussion of the controversy arising from his neo-imperialist approach, which places the
construction of the British Empire at the centre of the construction of the modern world.
5. The references are to the important work by John MacKenzie (1984), who showed how British society,
from the 1880s onwards, had been subjected to intense strategies of penetration by imperial mentality,
and by Edward Said (1978, 1984), who identiﬁed the features of an imperialist ideology within a
literary canon much wider than that which explicitly dealt with the Empire.
6. For their relevance to this topic rather than for comprehensiveness, see Thompson (2005, 2012); Hall
(2002); Hall and Rose (2006).
7. It would in fact be somewhat simplistic to describe Roberto Forges Davanzati as a ‘radio journalist’.
Before Galeazzo Ciano, then head of the regime’s press ofﬁce, gave him the task of the daily ‘Cronaca
del regime’ feature in 1933, Forges Davanzati had been a leading exponent of Italian nationalism, and
joined the Fascist Party in 1923. See the proﬁle by Silvana Casmirri (1997). On Gayda, Forges
Davanzati and other journalists mentioned later, see Forno (2012) and Allotti (2012).
8. To quote further: ‘All Britain’s wars and action towards imperial expansion, starting with the fortuitous
origins of the East Indies Company, although dressed up in the language of Christianity and the divine
mission of Britain, have been the product of the interests of its trade, industry, and City business. [ . . . ]
In this fatal rush Judaism, now dominant in British ﬁnance and embittered by the racial question, has
played an essential part. There are typical organisations of Jewish interests in which ﬁnance and
politics are confused, and anti-German and anti-Italian activity is being developed’ (Gayda 1941, 296).
9. As a correspondent for La Stampa and then L’Idea Nazionale, Gayda was witness to international
politics and among the most important observers; he was in Vienna before the Great War, in Russia
during it, and then in European capitals for the years of the post-war crisis, and established himself as
one of the most perceptive Italian analysts. In 1921 he was appointed editor of Il Messaggero, followed
Fascism’s rise to power sympathetically, and was one of the editors closest to Mussolini. From 1926 he
edited Il Giornale d’Italia, where his articles informally followed the government line on foreign
affairs. Gayda strongly supported the racial policies that the regime adopted, initially regarding
colonial citizens and then Jews. See the proﬁle by Mauro Canali (1999).
10. Cromwellian England should not be forgotten either. The protestant Cromwell ‘was already thinking
about a powerful British empire that could be equal to or even greater than the Roman one’, while
mercilessly attacking his Catholic subjects (Gayda 1941, 272).
11. Bevione attributed responsibility to the Asquith government: ‘None of this has happened because the
radical Liberals are in power: they are horriﬁed by bloodshed, and are naturally inclined to democratise
society rather than save their country’ (1910, 408). Similar fears, but with different conclusions, were
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nursed by the economist Riccardo Dalla Volta: concluding a volume that brought together his many
writings on Britain, he noted current changes and hoped ‘[t]hat the new conquests of British industrial
democracy will be in the future, as they were in the past, a victory for liberty and justice!’ (1912, 434).
12. Malagodi’s observations echoed the well-known comment by John Seeley, who lamented that the
British Empire was not created by any coherent strategy: ‘[w]e seem, as it were, to have conquered and
peopled half the world in a ﬁt of absence of mind’ (1883, 10).
13. See Omissi and Thompson (2002). For the repercussions in Italy, see Mangoni (1985, 226).
14. These voices included Il Regno, the magazine of Enrico Corradini, a great admirer of the expansionism
of Joseph Chamberlain: see Calderoni (1904). See also Demolins (1900).
15. This was a collection of a series of essays on education and society that had already appeared in La
Science Sociale, the journal Demolins edited.
16. Ferrero (1897) argued that the superiority of Anglo-Saxon peoples (in which he included the German
populations), presented as a given, owed itself to the deﬁnitive displacement of the chaotic and
primordial warrior instinct for supremacy by the ordered channelling of individual energies into
industrial and commercial development, which was the keystone of Anglo-Saxon primacy.
17. In the wake of A` quoi tient la superiorite´ des Anglo-Saxons, Demolins sought to act on its principles in
order to support a resurgence of the nation’s life, using the new educational model. In 1899, investing
his own resources and becoming directly involved, he founded the Ecole des Roches at Verneuil. This
school was organised along the principles speciﬁed: tutorial work by teachers, learning in small groups,
authority responsibly recognised rather than imposed, an emphasis on open-air activity, no learning by
rote, limited classical languages, the learning of natural sciences and many foreign languages. See
Bertier (1907).
18. On this issue see the volume edited by Mazzacane (1986), especially the contributions by Luisa
Mangoni and Saverio Cianferotti; see also Cassese (2010).
19. See the reconstruction by Enrica Bricchetto (2004).
20. According to Nicola Labanca, Italian expansion in Eritrea had been correctly described as ‘an accident
of British policy’ (2002, 62–64).
21. Gayda also traced Italian resentment back to ‘the violent wave of European hostility that assailed
Britain in 1900 due to its war on the Boers [ . . . ], a movement of sentimental insurrection against the
violent and relentless methods of British imperialism’ (1941, 107).
22. The Italian occupiers never succeeded in completely controlling the territory, and the severe, violent
and racist regime imposed on the population fuelled their permanent state of unrest, which was harshly
repressed by continuing military operations and massacres of civilians; this unrest was exploited by the
British army which backed a guerrilla war in support of its military operations in 1941. See Dominioni
(2008). A billion and a half lire had been set aside for the whole military campaign of 1935 and 1936,
but the actual costs proved to be a billion per month, and by 1939 total spending had reached 73 billion.
As often happens with military expenditure, such a large commitment of resources was too much of a
burden to allow for the stimulation of internal industrial production and international trade: the pattern
that developed instead was that large quantities of goods and ﬁnance were continuously being
channelled towards Ethiopia, creating an artiﬁcial ﬁnancial environment that would boost the value of
proﬁts from the new Empire. Moreover, with the ‘unjust sanctions’ imposed on Italy by the League of
Nations, there was the opportunity to reinforce protectionism, already a burden, with the policy of
‘autarky’, made much of in propaganda. For a country like Italy, with limited raw materials, imports
from its colonies could not balance out the losses from the restriction of imports from elsewhere (Petri
2002, 115–17). Finally, we should also consider the losses of men and equipment relating to support
for Franco in the Spanish Civil War and the occupation of Albania, which left Italy unprepared for the
enormous effort required by the alliance with Nazi Germany.
23. See, however, Canfora (1980, 2004a, 2004b); Cagnetta (1979); Giardina and Vauchez (2000); Gentile
(1993, 2007); Carandini et al. (2011); Nelis (2011)
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